Based on Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) and a series of experimental and correlational studies, Dijksterhuis and his colleagues conclude that when making complex choices/decisions, conscious thought-deliberation while attention is directed at the problem-leads to poorer choices/decisions than "unconscious thought"-deliberation in the absence of conscious attention directed at the problem. UTT comprises six principles said to apply to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity. Because the implications of UTT for psychological research and theory are considerable, the authors critically examined these six principles (and the studies used to support them) in light of the extant scholarship on unconscious processes, memory, attention, and social cognition. Our examination reveals that UTT is a theory of the unconscious that fails to take into account important work in cognitive psychology, particularly in the judgment and decision making area. Moreover, established literatures in social psychology that contradict fundamental tenets of UTT and its empirical basis are ignored. The authors conclude that theoretical and experimental deficiencies undermine the claims of the superiority of unconscious thinking as portrayed by UTT.
Thirty-five years ago, social psychologist Daryl Bem (1972) astutely foresaw an inevitable trend toward invoking unconscious mechanisms to account for a variety of psychological phenomena, and he warned of the epistemological abyss that could accompany such a trend. More than three decades have now passed, and research in the areas of cognitive and social psychology has in fact demonstrated, rather convincingly, that unconscious mental processes can influence our judgments, evaluations, memory, and behavior under certain conditions (e.g., Bargh, 1990; Jacoby, 1991; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Zajonc, 1980) . However, the portrait of the unconscious that has emerged is one that is quite limited in terms of the complexity of cognitive tasks it is capable of performing (cf. Greenwald, 1992) .
In direct contradiction to this work, Dijksterhuis and his colleagues (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; assert that to make complex decisions, conscious thinking or deliberation should be avoided so that a proposed new system of thought-unconscious deliberation-can be evoked to divine the "best" solutions. In a series of recent studies, these researchers conclude that attention directed toward solving a complex problem-conscious thought-leads to poorer choices/decisions than no attention whatsoever directed at the prob-lem-unconscious thought. Dijksterhuis et al. refer to this provocative and counterintuitive result as the deliberation-without-attention effect, which is predicated on their Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT).
UTT is an overarching model-encompassing six principles-that can be applied to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity. Because the implications for cognitive/ social psychology and judgment and decisionmaking research are considerable, we conducted a critical examination of UTT. Fundamental principles and research findings from the areas of cognitive psychology, social cognition and judgment, and decision making weigh heavily in our assessment of whether the proposed existence and superiority of unconscious thought is scientifically plausible or, as Bem (1972, p. 52) put it, simply "the next retreat into invisibility."
The "Unconscious Thought" Paradigm:
Manipulation of Attention
We first familiarize the reader with the typical experimental procedure used by Dijksterhuis et al. In the seminal study investigating the possibility of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis, 2004 , Experiment 1), participants viewed four apartments described in terms of 12 attributes, some of which were positive and others negative. The 48 pieces of information were randomized and each presented in the center of a computer screen for 4 seconds. That is, the information was not organized by apartment or by attribute. The apartments differed in terms of the number of positive and negative characteristics they possessed (e.g., "a very nice area" or "rather noisy"). The mostly positive apartment had one positive and four negative characteristics, whereas the mostly negative apartment had the opposite pattern. The other two apartments were intermediate with half of the characteristics being positive and half negative.
Participants in immediate, conscious, and unconscious experimental conditions were asked to view the information about the apartments with the goal of selecting an apartment at a later time. (In some of the experiments the instructions were to form an overall impression.) In the immediate condition participants made a decision as soon as they read all information (not all of the studies included this condition). In the conscious condition participants were asked to "very carefully think about what you think about the (options) apartments" (p. 589) for 3 to 4 minutes before making a decision. Finally, in the unconscious condition, participants made the decision after being distracted by some other task (e.g., solving anagrams) for 3 to 4 minutes. Hence, an important component of the Dijksterhuis procedure is the apparent enabling of the unconscious by diverting conscious attention to some irrelevant task. This pivotal technique will be referred to below as the distraction manipulation/task.
The key result from studies of this sort is that the unconscious group produces a mean preference that differs from the conscious group. In choice studies, the unconscious group reveals a higher choice probability for, or more favorable attitude toward, the mostly positive option when compared to the conscious group. As indicated above, Dijksterhuis et al. refer to this result as the deliberation-without-attention effect. We note, however, that this hypothesized effect is not always found; indeed, in his first two experiments, Dijksterhuis (2004) reported no statistically significant differences between these groups (e.g., 59.3% vs. 47.1% in Experiment 2).
Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT):
Review of the Six Principles
Principle 1: The Unconscious Thought Principle
This principle states that there are two modes of thought: unconscious and conscious. Unconscious thought comprises task-relevant processes that occur and are more efficient when conscious thought is directed elsewhere. Conscious thought, on the other hand, requires attention; thus, attention is a key property that distinguishes these two modes of thought.
The separation of mental activities in terms of conscious and unconscious processes has a long history in psychology. In Freudian psychoanalytic theory (1900s), there was a conscious, but most remarkably, there was an unconscious endowed with the ability to reconstruct memories and produce intellectual coherence as well as to manipulate emotions in search of affective balance (Erdelyi, 1992) . In the study of memory, Maine de Biran, a French nineteenth-century thinker, divided memory into mechanical and representational parts (Schacter & Tulving, 1994) . Mechanical memory is involved in the acquisition of motor and verbal habits and operates largely at a nonconscious level, whereas representative memory is involved in conscious recollection of ideas and events. Zajonc and colleagues (1980; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) proposed a dichotomy of mental processes not as separate as those of Maine de Biran. They associated consciousness with cognitive operations and unconscious processes with affective judgments. Zajonc's mere exposure effect shows that after processing stimuli, people later may be unable to recognize the stimuli, but nonetheless make reliable affective discriminations by indicating a greater liking for those stimuli previously presented. Although both systems are used to make judgments about the same set of stimuli, Zajonc (1998) argues for the independence of affect and cognition and goes further to posit an affective primacy, which proposes that the first reaction to a sensory stimulus is an affective reaction. Sloman (1996) proposed a dichotomy specific to decision making and judgment in which one form of reasoning is rule-based and dependent on language, whereas the second form is associative and automatic. Though this distinction seems particularly relevant to UTT, no reference is made to Sloman's work or to any of the other dichotomies mentioned above.
In a series of papers in the American Psychologist, Volume 47, 1992, a third "New Look" at the unconscious/conscious is reviewed by Greenwald. The unconscious that emerges from Greenwald's evaluation is "cognitively less sophisticated" (Greenwald, 1992, p. 766) than what was assumed by the psychoanalytic (Freudian) perspective. The new unconscious is also less well defined, as Greenwald notes, because in the emerging cognitive models the unconscious/conscious boundary seems to blur. In neural-network models (Rumelhart, McCleland, & PDP, 1986 ) parallel processing of information occurs at all levels of analysis from stimulation points (input units) to action points (output units). Greenwald further explains how two meanings of unconscious that we all experience, (a) unconscious cognition because of lack of attention to stimuli, and (b) lack of verbalization of the causes of behavior, are possible within the parallel processing view of the mind. It is the pattern of activations of hidden units in a network that embody the concept of processing. In this manner, a stimulus that has not been attended to can nevertheless impact behavior via its connections with units that have received direct input from the environment (the first meaning of unconscious); and lack of verbal descriptors can result if the output units dealing with language are not activated, whereas other nonverbal units are (the second meaning).
Similarly, using the framework of connectionism, Phaf and Wolters (1997) favor the view that all measured responses in an individual reflect a mixture of unconscious and conscious contributions. Constructive processes have access to latent information in the form of schemas, and conscious experience may be based on actual experiences or be based on internally activated knowledge that maintains its activation in a recurrent manner without the presence of external stimuli. Unconscious processing is viewed as patterns of activations that are subsymbolic, but can relate to symbolic units either as simple verbal codes or verbal codes connected to parts of the network that allow realworld context to infuse them with meaning.
Thus, modern conceptions of conscious/ unconscious processing from a cognitive neural-network modeling perspective make the dichotomy of unconscious and conscious entities a misnomer. In this light, UTT's first principle reverts to a historically significant, but outdated unconscious/conscious distinction.
Attention plays an important role in UTT, and the link between conscious processing and attention has a long history, but has fallen out of favor with many researchers. Shiffrin (1997) notes that in the fields of philosophy and psychology the relation between attention and consciousness has been an important one for over a century (e.g., James, 1890, 1904 as cited by Shiffrin). However, he also notes that a definitive separation of the conscious and unconscious via attention has proven elusive. Simply stated, Shiffrin argues that tasks are never fully attentive or fully automatic. An example of the lack of a clear link between consciousness and attention occurs in the dichotic listening task. In this task, different messages are presented to the two ears but participants attend to only one ear. When the message received in the primary ear is attended to, that is, repeated by the participant, very little information is consciously processed in the other ear (Johnston & Dark, 1986) . Nevertheless, certain words presented in the nonattended ear, such as one's name, are processed and a variety of experiments have demonstrated that information reaches consciousness quickly even though it is not the focus of attention. That is, nonattended stimuli can be consciously processed, which implies that attention is not a prerequisite for conscious processing to take place. Another area of research that shows the conceptual ambiguity of the concept of attention occurs in "subliminal perception." In this paradigm, the task may be fully attended to, but the stimulus is presented for so brief a time that the participant is not aware of the stimulus. He or she cannot verbally report its presence even though all attentional resources are dedicated to the stimulus. Furthermore, such stimuli can affect related verbal responses. Marcel (1983a Marcel ( , 1983b , for instance, found that a lexical decision regarding a stimulus is facilitated when it follows a related stimulus.
A final weakness we identify with UTT's first principle is that it leaves the relationship between unconscious and conscious thinking undefined. In a review, Reingold and Toth (1996;  see also Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997) reasoned that any theory that seeks to explain dissociations between responses via the unconscious/conscious dichotomy must specify their relationship. They discuss three possible relations that theories may presuppose: (a) Exclusivity assumes no overlap between these two processes; that is, one operates or the other, but not both. (b) Redundancy views the consciousness as the tip of an unconscious iceberg (this is similar to Freud's notion according to Loftus & Klinger, 1992) . (c) Independence assumes that both processes operate independently and do not need each other, but they can interact. Because of the use of the distraction task in UTT research, the unconscious presumably functions best when conscious processing is engaged in some other task. This is the view of an exclusive relationship. On the other hand, UTT also stipulates that the unconscious operates in the background whereas the conscious is simultaneously working on some other task, as in language comprehension and generation (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 96) . This is a redundancy relationship. Both of these positions are in contradistinction to research findings that support concurrent and independent systems that interact, such as Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation theory, Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, and Payne's (2002) dual-retrieval model, and in a number of other models (Bellezza, 2003; Reingold & Toth, 1996) .
In summary, the Unconscious Thought Principle is not in line with current parallel processing models of cognition that have begun to abandon the dual-entity approach to explaining psychological phenomena. The principle relies on equating consciousness with attention, a view that is currently met with skepticism by many prominent cognitive researchers. The principle provides no clear statement as to how unconscious and conscious processing relate to each other; and, from what we can deduce, the most plausible relationship suggested by the Unconscious Thought Principle appears to contradict the relevant research findings and theoretical models.
Principle 2: The Capacity Principle
This principle states that unconscious thought has a much larger capacity than conscious thought. Capacity is further defined as the amount of information transmitted in bits per second.
The concept of capacity adopted by UTT goes back to the cognitive revolution of the 1940s that made heavy use of information theory as a framework for understanding cognition. In that framework, information (units of bits), flows in a sequential manner from a source to another location. Because it takes time and space to do this, and because simple symbolic units, such as the No. 8, may need several bits to be represented, manipulating information consciously appears a daunting task. Furthermore, UTT relies on Miller's (1956) proposal that conscious awareness (more precisely short-term memory) has a limited capacity of about seven units.
We begin by noting that the principle assumes a well-defined unconscious/conscious dichotomy so that capacity of the entire system can be used to derive the capacity of its parts. In calculations, the entire human system's capacity is 11,200,000 bits per second, and conscious' capacity is between 10 and 60 bits per second (p. 97). Thus, the difference between 11ϩ mil-lion and 60 bits is the capacity of the unconscious by mutual exclusivity. However, much of the 11,200,000 bits per second includes the processing capacity of visual perception, and as we already pointed out, current parallel processing views of cognition consider an unconscious/ conscious dichotomy superfluous.
Another aspect of this principle that appears outdated, in light of parallel processing models, is the focus on the rate of information transmittal (bits per time unit) over the more critical function of information organization. In addition, we note that when Miller (1956) discussed the capacity of short-term memory in terms of units of information, the units were chunks, not bits. It was essentially the finding that recoding an input string into larger chunks increases the number of bits recalled that ". . .signaled the beginning of the end of the information theory approach to cognitive capacity" (Shiffrin & Nosofsky, 1994, p. 359) .
Lastly, we concur with Shiffrin (1997) that capacity arguments are insufficient for differentiating unconscious from conscious thought. In the empirical approach to determining capacity, the demand on resources that a process requires is measured via interference tasks. The idea is that if a stimulus requires attention, and thus demands cognitive resources, another stimulus requiring resources will interfere with the processing of the first. However, as Shiffrin points out, there are many stimuli that we are aware of, which do not produce interference in other tasks (e.g., the shape of the computer screen does not interfere with one's writing).
Principle 3: The Bottom-Up-Versus-TopDown Principle
This principle states that unconsciousness works bottom-up (aschematically) whereas consciousness works top-down (schematically). In addition, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006, p. 98) suggest that in decision making unconscious thought slowly integrates information to form an objective summary judgment, as opposed to conscious decision making which is much faster. A key hypothesis emanating from this account is that unconscious thinking leads to more polarized evaluative representations than conscious thinking.
According to Barsalou (1992) , when information is viewed to flow from the environment to the cognitive system via a sensory modality, this is bottom-up processing, whereas when expectations appear to guide behavior, the flow of information reverses, and this is described as top-down processing. Although the distinction appears uncontroversial, research has shown that even basic cognitive processes need a more complex pattern of information flow. For example, categorization is the ability of humans to classify different kinds of stimuli (objects, sounds of speech, physical movements, etc.). Categories are conceived as cognitive structures or representations of the environment, and although categorization occurs relatively fast and outside of conscious awareness, leading theories appear to conclude that categorization necessitates both bottom-up and top-down processing (Barsalou, 1992) . Furthermore, leading models of categorization require complex knowledge structures, whether information is viewed to flow in one or in another direction. For example, in identifying a word, spreading activation models may posit the existence of basic (or innate) detectors of properties such as detectors of line segments that get activated and grouped to form detectors for letters, which in turn get grouped to form detectors for words, and so forth. The detectors both receive and send information, and thus the flow is bidirectional. This means that a word may become active (so that it is recognized) starting from its basic line segment composition (e.g., parts of the word "table" include line segments -and |) or from being related to another word that is usually used along with it (e.g., "table" gets activated by the word "chair"). In addition, the detectors can be simple (primitive) or complex in the network.
Recent advances in speech perception demonstrate the role of bidirectional communication between lexical (acoustic identifications) and prelexical (manipulation of the raw acoustic signals) processes (McCleland, Mirman, & Holt, 2006) . More generally, connectionist or associative learning models (Rumelhart et al., 1986) rely heavily on the concepts of interconnections (excitatory or inhibitory) among simple and complex representations in cognition. The implications of this research for UTT are that a theory that dichotomizes processing as either bottom-up or top-down is too simplistic and contradicts what is known about the manner in which information is acquired and used by the cognitive system. Second, the idea that the unconscious works slowly also contradicts known views. It has often been suggested that unconscious processes occur in parallel, and are automatic and fast, whereas conscious processing is serial, deliberate, and slow (e.g., Sloman, 1996) . An example of unconscious processing occurring very quickly is pattern recognition. As was true with categorization, complex representations of information occur at all levels of processing. The visual perception of objects, for example, may rely on constructs that are complex representations of stimuli as described by Beiderman (1987 Beiderman ( , 1993 . Geon theory assumes that objects are represented as an arrangement of simple, viewpoint-invariant, volumetric primitives (geons), such as cylinders, wedges, cones, and their curved axis counterparts. Similarly, in the Pandemonium model of pattern recognition (Selfridge, 1959) , there is a hierarchy of nodes (called demons) that represent aspects of the information, from feature demons to cognitive demons, and there is a system of interconnections representing organization of information in memory at different levels. Thus, the perceptual process is best described as schematic, even if some aspects of this process occur without conscious awareness.
Unconscious processing results in the polarization of information. According to UTT, the unconscious organizes information in a new way rather than using the organization of semantic memory. This is captured in the notion of polarization, which is a more pronounced difference between a final and an initial attitude toward a judged object, or a greater difference between positive and negative attitudes. A significant problem with the line of reasoning advanced by this principle of UTT is the direct contradiction with a considerable body of work demonstrating that mere conscious thought produces more polarized representations and evaluations than is the case when such thought is precluded by distraction (Tesser, 1978) . Moreover, this literature has established that such polarization with conscious thought requires the existence of a well-developed or complex schema (Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977) . That is, schema-guided thought leads individuals to generate new cognitions that are evaluatively consistent with their prior beliefs, to block inconsistent cognitions, or to reinterpret inconsistent cognitions to make them more evaluatively consistent. Any one or combination of these processes serves to increase the overall evaluative consistency of beliefs associated with a particular evaluation, thereby causing that evaluation to polarize (Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Lassiter, Apple, & Slaw, 1996) .
These well-established findings seem irreconcilable with tenets of UTT. First, if unconscious thought works best when conscious thought is directed away from a task, why do the studies in the existing thought-polarization literature show no polarization under distraction? Second, unconscious thought is characterized as aschematic, yet the thought-polarization literature clearly shows that polarization results from schema-driven processes. Thus, the contention that unconscious thought is associated with greater polarization than is conscious thought completely ignores a vast body of theory and research indicating exactly the opposite is true.
Evidence for greater polarization with unconscious than conscious thought was sought in Experiment 4 (Dijksterhuis, 2004) . In this as well as in Experiment 3, participants read information about three hypothetical people in random order with the goal of determining with whom they would like to share an apartment. Each potential roommate was described in terms of 12 characteristics, some of which were positive and others negative. One roommate was made "attractive" by having more positive/ fewer negative traits than the other two possible choices-one of which was "neutral" (having an equal number of positive and negative traits) and one of which was "unattractive" (having more negative/fewer positive traits). In a later allocation task, participants were presented with the characteristics of the roommates without their identifying labels and were asked to indicate to which roommate a characteristic belonged. The polarization hypothesis was not supported, because there were no differences among the immediate, unconscious, and conscious groups in terms of correctly allocating positive and negative attributes to the attractive and unattractive roommates, respectively. In fact, all groups showed evidence of polarization: "[i]t was predicted that the unconscious thinkers especially would polarize, but the three-way interaction was not significant" (p. 594).
In addition, this study showed that the unconscious participants had a lower proportion of accurate allocations, particularly of negative aspects when compared to the same allocations for the other groups. As far as we can tell, the only purported evidence of greater polarization for the unconscious participants derives from an analysis of the speed of allocations variable conducted only on a subset of the data (i.e., the analysis excluded the neutral roommate and included only attributes that were allocated correctly). Furthermore, the paradigm cannot prevent the unconscious participants from accessing schemas and other highly organized knowledge structures when they read and encode information in the acquisition phase of the studies. Thus, the mechanisms involved in polarization may include schemas even for the unconscious participants. In light of these myriad problems, we conclude that "the evidence [in Experiment 4] for polarization of representation in memory is fairly strong" (p. 594) is more hyperbole than fact.
Representation and clustering. Experiment 5 (Dijksterhuis, 2004) tested whether unconscious thought led to a more differentiated memory representation as measured by clustering. The experimental paradigm followed very closely that used by various researchers in the person-memory/person-perception literature (Hastie, Ostrom, Ebbesen, Wyer, Hamilton, & Carlston, 1980) . In this literature, the goal is to understand how people form opinions of other people from observing them acting, or reading descriptions of them. Inferential processes are at the core of such mechanisms and the consensus of the field is that schemas play a crucial role in the process of aggregation (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980) . That is, the information that comes in from the environment does not fall into a vacuum, and because an impression is defined as a cognitive representation of a person, Hamilton et al. posit that a coherent cognitive representation will emphasize characteristics that provide evaluative consistency. This view is in direct contradiction with UTT, even though the methodologies employed are virtually identical.
A typical experiment of Hamilton et al. (1980) had participants read a series of sentence predicates (about 15). Half of the participants were instructed to form an impression of the person being described in the sentences and the other half was asked to memorize the sentences. After the instructions, participants in both groups performed a filler task for 3 to 5 minutes to eliminate short-term memory effects. The main dependent variables were free recall of the information and clustering indices based on the order of the recalled information. A main finding from these studies is that participants asked to form an impression demonstrated greater clustering of information than participants asked to memorize the sentences. Additionally, Hamilton et al. conclude that schemas are influential in encoding stimuli as well as in storing and organizing the information.
Participants in Experiment 5 of Dijksterhuis (2004) read behavioral descriptions about a person that could be classified into three trait categories. Participants were then asked to recall the information immediately, after some conscious thought, or after being distracted. Half of the participants received impression-formation instructions and the other half was asked to memorize the information. The only substantial difference between this study and that of Hamilton et al.'s (1980) is the addition of the immediate and the conscious groups. In terms of correct recall, there were no significant differences among the conditions, but a measure of recall organization demonstrated higher clustering by participants in the unconscious condition when averaging across instructions. The results also showed a main effect of instructions in line with Hamilton et al.'s findings that the task of forming an impression results in higher clustering than the task of memorizing. However, a puzzling aspect of these data is that the unconscious group produced higher mean clustering irrespective of the goal of forming impressions or memorize, and there was no interaction. The unconscious group, however, did the same task as Hamilton et al.'s participants and we would expect a replication of the earlier results. The replication failed and the authors ignored this surprising inconsistency.
In summary, the Bottom-Up-versus-TopDown Principle is problematic because it assumes that the information processed unconsciously is not organized through the use of any knowledge structure in semantic memory such as a chunk, a category, a schema, and so on. It also assumes a one-way flow of information for either conscious or unconscious processing and a slow rather than fast mechanism of integration for unconscious relative to conscious processing. The cognitive and social cognition literatures, on the contrary, show that complex representations exists at many levels of processing; the flow of information in current network models is bidirectional, and many automatic processes that occur outside of awareness are fast rather than slow. Finally, in direct opposition to the Bottom-Up-versus-Top-Down Principle, current theory and research indicates that polarization and clustering processes occur more readily with than without schemas.
Principle 4: The Weighting Principle
This principle claims that the unconscious weights the relative importance of attributes in an efficient manner, whereas conscious thought leads to suboptimal weighting. In the decisionanalysis literature (French, 1986) options are conceived as having attribute values (e.g., a car costs $40k) and importance refers to the weight a person attaches to an attribute category (e.g., the importance of price). In compensatory models, importance weights are distributed among all of the attributes and they add to 100%. These weights multiply subjective values to obtain overall values for options (typically using a linear aggregation model). In this process, a low subjective value can be offset by having a high importance weight attached to it. Similarly, a low value in one dimension can be compensated by a high value in another attribute. Within this framework, we find it difficult to assess the evidence for the claim that the unconscious does appropriate weighting. First, participants were asked for the importance of specific levels of attributes rather than for the importance of the attribute category, and second, there was no assessment of decision making strategies to shed light on weighting differences between the groups. For example, Dijksterhuis' (2004) Experiment 3 asked participants to view 36 pieces of information that described three potential roommates. According to the procedures (p. 592), participants made importance judgments for specific levels of an attribute (e.g., "How important is it for you that a roommate is neat?"). Clearly, the rating is not of importance in the decision analytical sense, but rather a subjective valuation. Moreover, Dijksterhuis (2004) computed a preference variable as the difference in preference rating between the mostly positive and the mostly negative roommate (ignoring the other options). He also created an importance measure by summing the importance ratings across the eight positive characteristics and across the eight negative characteristics, whereas those of the other four attributes were subtracted. These two variables were correlated and it was found that the correlations were not significantly different among the conditions. In particular, there was no difference between the conscious and unconscious groups. These null results in no way constitute support for the Weighting Principle.
Principle 5: The Rule Principle
This principle states that conscious thought can follow strict rules and yield precise answers. In contrast, unconscious thought gives rise to only rough estimates. This characterization of unconscious thought is reminiscent of the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who proposed that in making judgments, people often times employ simple heuristics to produce estimates. These authors never dealt with the unconscious, however, and the vast literature on biased probability judgments suggests that people are generally poor at, rather than good at, generating accurate estimates.
The authors describe a study by Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, and Gütig (2001) on behalf of this principle. In this study, participants evaluated ads presented on a computer screen while information about the price performance of shares of stocks flashed on other parts of the screen. The results showed that individuals were unable to explicitly provide estimates of sums and averages across the shares, but were able to accurately evaluate each share (as if the unconscious had done such computations). However, a closer examination of the Betsch et al.'s study reveals that people making immediate choices about the shares were more likely to pick the good ones based on what the researchers termed value accounts (defined as summary evaluations of accumulated information) in contrast to participants who were forced to wait 6 seconds before making the choices. What aspects of this experiment truly support the superiority of the unconscious as advocated by Dijksterhuis and colleagues? The similarities of the two paradigms are derived arbitrarily, and in fact, Betsch 
Principle 6: The Convergence-VersusDivergence Principle
This principle contends that unconscious thinking is more divergent than conscious thinking, and thus is better suited for tasks that call for creative solutions. In presenting their arguments, Dijksterhuis and colleagues draw on the notion that after a period of time away from focusing directly on a particularly difficult problem, the answer, which was not forthcoming at first, may become readily apparent-a phenomenon termed incubation by Wallas (1926) . A recent review of the experimental incubation literature by Dodds, Ward, and Smith (in press) found that roughly 75% of reported experiments have obtained successful incubation effects. However, when such evidence is obtained, it is rarely explained as being the result of an unconscious process, which Dijksterhuis and colleagues have acknowledged (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006) .
It is certainly the case that incubation was originally conceptualized as involving some kind of unconscious mental work (Wallas, 1926) ; however, the assumption that the benefits of incubation are the result of an unconscious process was quickly challenged. As early as 1938, Woodworth argued that the role of unconscious processing in incubation "should be left as a residual hypothesis for adoption only if other, more testable hypotheses break down" (a cautionary note later echoed by Bem, 1972) . Since then such testable hypotheses have been developed (e.g., the forgetting-fixation hypothesis, Smith & Blankenship, 1989 , and the returning-act hypothesis, Segal, 2004) , none of which posits that unconscious, or even conscious, activity is required to account for the benefits of taking one's mind off of challenging problems. Whereas the notion of incubation was once inextricably intertwined with the unconscious, the current view of its nature typically places no emphasis on the role of the unconscious, not even a passive one (Olton, 1979) .
A critical aspect of this now dominant view is the assumption that considerable conscious work on the problem must occur before the break period to achieve successful incubation (Olton, 1979) . In light of this development, researchers have turned to exploring the effect of such preincubation preparation periods on successful problem solving (Kaplan, 1989; Silveira, 1971 ). Silveira (1971) , for example, permitted participants either 3 or 13 minutes of preparation time, and then provided a break from the task of equal duration for both groups. Silveira reported a successful incubation effect only for those in the long-preparation condition, in which participants would have had a reasonable amount of time to concentrate deeply and consciously on the problem at hand. Thus, it appears that positive effects of a break period only manifest when it is preceded by extensive conscious activity focused on the target problem.
To account for such results, researchers have argued that after a period of thorough, cognitive immersion with a problem, a break or distraction period provides time for seemingly compelling, albeit nondiagnostic, cues to fade from memory, thereby permitting other cues that could be critical to finding a viable solution a greater opportunity to receive attention and contemplation. Consistent with this interpretation, studies indicate that greater forgetting of misleading cues or faulty initial strategies is positively associated with successful incubation effects (e.g., Segal, 2004; Smith & Blankenship, 1989) . Weisberg (1986) argues that the connection between hard, deliberate work coupled with excellent memory is a far more compelling basis for creativity than the mysterious workings of the unconscious. For example, Poincaré worked many hours a day on a mathematical conundrum he knew very well. He was unrelenting in his pursuit of a solution, and he did not get away on vacation to forget about the problem on which he focused (see also Hadamard, 1954) . His creative insight may seem to have come out of thin air, but there can be little doubt that his achievement was made possible by his immense power of concentration.
Dijksterhuis et al.'s contention is that "conscious thought stays firmly under the searchlight, [whereas] unconscious thought ventures out to the dark and dusty nooks and crannies of the mind" (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006, p. 138) .
In studies claimed to support this notion, naïve participants generated a list of new names of pasta, places starting with the letter "A," or uses for a brick, after either thinking consciously about the task or after being distracted. The results showed no differences in the number of items people generated, but the conclusion is that the creative quality of the items was greater for the unconscious than the conscious group. How was creative quality judged? According to the authors, the conscious thinkers listed more items that were similar to the examples initially provided by the experimenter (e.g., names ending with the letter "I"), whereas the unconscious group did not. But what about forgetting? No recall measure was included in these studies, so this possibility, which has received support as a mediator of incubation effects (Segal, 2004; Smith & Blankenship, 1989) , cannot be ruled out as an adequate explanation of the more "creative" responses of the distraction group.
The remaining studies by Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) in support of the creativity of the unconscious depart substantially from the standard incubation methodology, because participants do not have enough time to study the problem in depth. Thus, we focus on the weaknesses of this new methodology. Specifically, the distraction task involved chasing a moving circle on a video monitor using a computer "mouse." Whereas this task certainly occupied perceptual/visual processing resources, it is unlikely to have entirely disrupted the highly conceptual conscious processing (Melcher & Schooler, 2004) needed to perform well on a task of "creativity." Although Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) do admit that this condition could be more appropriately termed "less conscious," they importantly fail to acknowledge that a covert rehearsal interpretation (Seifert et al., 1995) , which assumes active and conscious work during the incubation interval, cannot be ruled out.
The Convergence-versus-Divergence Principle relies on two pieces of evidence; anecdotal evidence of the unconscious in incubation and the studies by Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) . A recent review of incubation by Dodds, Ward, and Smith (in press) ended with a call to arms to researchers on incubation and captures the unequivocal negative sentiment in the current incubation literature toward an unconscious explanation: "We urge researchers not to incubate on incubation, but rather pursue a direct and deliberate attack on the problem." In sum, the studies by Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) offered in support of the Convergence-versusDivergence Principle do not properly control for potential conscious explanations for the effects. Specifically, the lack of recall measures, and in some instances the use of an inadequate distraction task, make it impossible to rule out viable alternative hypotheses for their so-called incubation effects.
UTT and Decision Making
Assessing the Optimality Concept A conclusion from UTT is that the unconscious can yield better decisions. Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and van Baaren (2006) state: ". . . in four studies we demonstrated the deliberation-without-attention effect. Conscious thinkers were better able to make the best choice among simple products, whereas unconscious thinkers were better able to make the best choice among complex products" (p. 1007). The first question we ask is whether the best choice is indisputably so, and this requires a formal definition of optimality.
In all of the studies produced by Dijksterhuis et al., they define the optimal choice (in a normative sense, see p. 1006 in as the option that has the greater number of positive qualities. But, is this definition correct? What if the less positive option scores extremely well in an attribute that is very important to a decision maker? For example, would you drive a car with a sticky manual transmission even if it scores well in many other aspects? I would not. Simply put, there is no a priori normative reason to think that a car with a myriad of positive values (and a single bad one) is the best car for all people.
The basic tenets of decision theory reside in the concept of personal utility first proposed by Bernoulli (1738, as cited by French, 1986) , and the theory of rational choice later developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and by Savage (1954) . In these theories, utilities are subjective and idiosyncratic, and thus the rationality of a decision cannot be judged by comparing preferences of individuals to external references, not even to the preferences of experts. Rationality is judged from the standard of an internally consistent system in which actions stemming from preferences must satisfy principles of "good thinking" that are called axioms of rationality (French, 1986) .
Psychologists have for many years tested people's adherence to these principles and the conclusion from this research is that people do not follow them. However, that people's preferences show inconsistency does not necessarily endanger the status of a decision theory that focuses on defining optimality from an agreed upon mathematical standard. A similar argument was made by Meyer and Johnson (1989) when commenting on research by Keller and Staelin (1987, as cited by Meyer and Johnson) . Keller and Staelin claimed that information overload decreased decision accuracy of consumers. The problem with this claim, as Meyer and Johnson noted, lies in how to define consumer error unambiguously. Any definition of error underlies an analyst's assumption of how information should be combined and must be made explicit. Because of the natural indeterminacy of this combination, a narrower definition of error-that based on internal consistency of the decisions-is desirable.
What measure of internal consistency did Dijksterhuis and colleagues use? None. They assumed that the best option corresponded with the linear aggregation of positive values (ignoring the negative values). This is a special case of a Multiattribute Utility evaluation model (Edwards & Newman, 1986) in which all attributes are weighted equally and all subjective values are either 1s or 0s. There are other possibilities, but the authors provided no evidence that the participants had weights and values that would place the experimenter's best option as the best option for them. In sum, evidence in favor of any mechanism that is able to select the best option must first have a definition of "best."
In preferences, the level of personal value associated with characteristics as well as the level of importance given to attributes both matter in defining "best." Without knowing what those levels are for each and every person the data are inconclusive.
A test of rationality. The principle of dominance states that one option is superior to another, at least weakly so, if it yields a better outcome using at least one attribute and is as good or better than the other option using all other attributes. Thus by dominance, we can define a best option after assuming that there is an order, either increasing or decreasing, of the subjective values associated with levels of the attributes. For example, we can probably safely assume that greater quality ratings increase subjective value for most people, or that greater cost is less desirable.
Using dominance and the Dijksterhuis paradigm, we tested the superiority of the unconscious. Participants viewed the options that appear in Table 1 , which is a complex decision by Dijksterhuis' standards because there are 40 pieces of information. The structure of the stimuli differs from that of a typical Dijksterhuis' study, however, because there is a weakly dominant option-a car named Reni. The other variation to their paradigm is that some attributes were described with number of stars (with more stars denoting a better score), which is a typical rating method used by car dealerships on Internet sites and in other consumer reports. Following the unconscious procedure of the Dijksterhuis paradigm, a group of 23 participants viewed the characteristics of the cars in random order on a computer screen and were then distracted for 5 minutes. Following the distraction period, they were asked to reveal their preferred option. Did the unconscious thinkers overwhelmingly select the dominant option? No, Subjective indicators of the "right" decision. In Studies 3 and 4, reported that unconscious thinkers exhibited more postchoice satisfaction than conscious thinkers when the decision was complex. Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) similarly found that participants who made selections of posters after solving anagrams for 7.5 minutes ended up more satisfied with their selections 3 to 5 weeks later than either those who made selections immediately or after consciously thinking about each poster. These results suggest that the unconscious thinkers faired better, if indeed better means to have unchanging tastes over time.
This pattern, however, may not be indicative of unconscious thinking leading to better decisions (as they better predict the future) as Dijksterhuis et al. contend. Instead, it could be because of a shifting-standards effect (Biernat, 2005) . Biernat and her colleagues (e.g., Biernat & Manis, 1994; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) have shown that when people are allowed to use subjective measurement scales they often exhibit a corresponding adjustment in the standards on which an evaluation is based, which can lead to a misinterpretation of the real meaning of their evaluation.
For example, Biernat et al. (1991) reported that when participants were asked to assess the personal income of various men and women by indicating the "dollars earned per year"-an objective response scale-they correctly judged that men on average have higher incomes than women. However, when income judgments were made on a subjective scale with endpoints of financially very unsuccessful and financially very successful, the pattern reversed. The authors explained these results by arguing that when participants used the subjective rating scale, they differentially adjusted the meaning of the anchors according to the target's gender.
That is, to be considered comparably successful financially, a man would have to earn considerably more money than a woman.
Applying this shifting-standards logic to the satisfaction findings, we suggest that participants who were prevented from consciously attending to the choice problem relaxed their standard for judging something to be satisfactory. Even those who had to make a decision immediately would have a sounder basis for their decision than those who had to choose after engaged in a completely unrelated task for several minutes that would impair their memory of information most relevant to the choice being made. Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) in fact, report data that are consistent with this line of reasoning. Unconscious thinkers were shown to be more indecisive than both conscious thinkers and participants not allowed to think at all. If you didn't have a strong preference to begin with, there is no reason for dissatisfaction with your choice at a later time. In addition, we note that Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) failed to replicate the findings by Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren, and LaFleur (1993) showing that careful examination of the reasons for making a particular choice reduced later satisfaction with that choice compared to a nothinking condition. They provide no explanation for this failure to replicate.
Finally, we call into question Dijksterhuis et al.'s intimation that stable preferences are better than changing ones. Should the preferences for art of a student be constant while she obtains her Master of Fine Arts degree? Indeed, it is our ability to change that makes learning a possibility and we would be very disappointed if a degree in Fine Arts left students' art preferences unaltered.
Summary
In conclusion, we believe UTT in its current form is an inadequately conceived and developed theory of the unconscious that makes little use of research in cognitive psychology in the areas of memory and attention and overlooks established literatures in social psychology that contradict its basic tenets. It is a theory built on a cursory understanding of decision theory, and a way of thinking that attempts to maintain the myths of the role of the unconscious on creative incubation. Given these various problems plaguing UTT and the studies supporting it, we conclude that the deliberation-without-attention effect is currently unsubstantiated.
